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Abstract. Over  the  past  few years,  certification  standards  have  become  increasingly  relevant  for  
the  agribusiness  sector.  Substantial  parts  of  the  value  chain  are  already  certified  by  standards  
such  as  QS, IFS or  EurepGap.  It is not  known,  however,  whether  these  approaches  can  actually 
ensure  a  high  quality  control.  This  article  is based  on  the  analysis  of  the  data  base  of the  QS-
system  with  more  than  72,000  companies  involved.  It tries  to  deduce  some  first  empirically  rich  
hypotheses  about  the  connection  between  auditing  quality  and  the  institutional  framing  of  the  
certification.
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1. Introduction
Over   the   past   few   years,   certification   procedures   have   gained   great  
importance   in   the   agribusiness   sector   as   an   instrument   of   quality 
assurance.  The QS-system  in Germany  alone  has  already  conducted  more  
than  100,000  audits,  mainly  in the  meat  industry,  covering,  for  example, 
about  30 % of  all pork  producers.  The  animal  feed  industry  and  all the  
important   German   slaughterhouses   have   also   been   covered   as   well. 
Additionally,   about  5,300  retail   stores   have  been   audited   since  2001. 
Besides  QS, the  International  Food  Standard  (IFS) and  EurepGap  are  also 
widely- used.  Currently,   more  than   3,340   food  producers  are  certified  
according  to the  IFS (approx.  60 % of these  in Germany). EurepGap  has  a 
strong  international  angle: More than  30,000  certificates  have been  issued  
in the  fruit  and  vegetable  sector  in more  than  60  countries,  covering  an 
area of more  than  2 million acres  (830,000  hectares) [1].
In   contrast   to  this   rapid   diffusion,   the  debate   about   the   question   of 
whether  this  type  of quality  assurance  can  reliably perform  its  tasks  has  
so far been  neglected.  As is known,  there  have been  quality scandals  even 
after  the  set- up  of the  QS-system  (spoiled  meat,  dioxin  in animal  feed). 
Although  QS-audited  firms  were  only marginally involved  in these  cases, 
a few carefully critical voices have risen. Kiefer [2] stated  that  companies  in 
the poultry  sector  perceived  the control  pressure  after  the initial ISO 9000  
certification  to   be  rather  low   and  thus   calmly  looked  forward  to  the  
follow- up  audits.  In conversations  with  farmers,  it is repeatedly  pointed  
out   that   the   certification   is   more   a   formal   inspection   than   a   valid 
examination   of   the   quality   standards .  In   personal   conversations   we 
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further  hint  for  the  weaknesses  of  the  auditing  practice  is the  comical 
rephrasing  of GMP-audits  from  “Good  Manufacturing  Practice”  in „Give 
Me Papers“.  Altogether,  given  the  high  costs  and  expectations  linked  to 
the  set- up  of  the  quality  certification,  it seems  reasonable  to  critically 
review the validity and  reliability of audits. 
Thus,  in  this  paper  we  will focus  on  the  effectiveness  of  certification  
structures  and  analyse  these  for the  agribusiness  on a broad  quantitative 
basis.   Considering   the   manifold   resources   that   currently   go   into   the 
development  of  quality  assurance  systems  as  EurepGap,  QS or  IFS, the  
question  of  whether  these  are  more  than  just  a  superficial  veneer  of 
legitimation  becomes  essential.
2. Trust in agricultural marketing 
According  to  the  traditional  economic  model,  the  market  is the  meeting  
point  of  supply  and  demand  with  the  aim  of  exchanging  homogeneous  
produc ts. The (neo- ) classic model  implies  that  both  suppliers  and  buyers  
are  fully informed  about  all commodities  concerned.  In fact,  neither  are 
all   traded   goods   homogeneous,   nor   are   all   participants   equally   well 
informed.   Market   activities   are   often   characterized   by   far- reaching  
information  deficits  that  impede  the  smooth  functioning  of  markets [3]. 
Depending  on the degree  of information  asymmetry  between  supplier  and  
customer,  different  types  of  goods  can  be  identified  according  to  the  
dominant  quality attributes  (cf. Figure 1)[4]. 
Figure 1. Typology of goods  based  on information  economics  (Jahn  et al. 
2005)
In   Figure   1,   another   quality   dimension   is   added   to   the   classical 
information   economics   typology   of   search,   experience,   and   credence  
attributes.   “Potemkin”   attributes [5]  are   characterized   by   the   fact   that  
neither  the  buyer  nor  external  institutions  are  able  to  carry  out  controls  
through  laboratory  analyses  at the  end- product  level. This holds  true  for 
nearly  all  process- oriented  attributes  (e.g.,  organic  production,  animal 
welfare,   kosher   foods,   dolphin- safe   tuna,   fair   trade).   In   the   case   of 
credence  attributes,  in contrast,  fraud  and  mislabelling can be revealed  by 
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competitors [6]. Test  results  are spread  among  the  customers  via the  mass  
media. The likelihood  of detecting  firms  falsely claiming  specific credence  
qualities   depends   on   (a)  the   amount   of   monitoring   in   the   respective  
product  category  and  (b) whether  the  company  is  famous  enough  for 
newspaper  reports.  Assuming  a strict  third- party  monitoring  and  a high 
disclosure   rate,   credence   goods   could   theoretically   be   treated   as 
experience  goods [7]. Third  parties  supplying  customers  with  information  
about  credence  goods  result  in reliable quality signals. As a consequence,  
specific   marketing   investments   (advertising,   branding)   bind  
manufacturers   although   high   information   asymmetries   create   strong  
incentives  for cheating [8].
The information  asymmetry  related  to Potemkin  attributes  can, however, 
not  easily  be  by- passed  by classical  quality  signals  such  as  advertising,  
branding,  and  guarantees.  Quality  characteristics  are  closely  connected  
with  the  production  process  that  is hidden  to the  out- side  observer.  The 
only   way   to   detect   fraud   is   the   direct   monitoring   of   the   company's  
internal   production   process.   For   most   third   parties,   for   example, 
consumer  agencies  or  other  stakeholders,  this  is  not  feasible,  as  only 
public   authorities   have   the   right   to   conduct   investigations   within   a 
company.  Additionally,  these  rights  are  restricted  to  cases  of suspected  
contravention   (e.g.,   threats   to   food   safety,   environmental   harm). 
Furthermore,  for a comprehensive  control  to be exerted,  sufficient  public 
manpower  and  budgetary  means  must  be available. In the  case  of private  
standards  there  is no legal basis  at all for public or private  control  of the  
production  process.  
Finally, in the case of Potemkin  attributes  quality statements  can be made  
with  hardly  any  risk  of  disclosure,  as  consumer  agencies,  NGO’s, and  
public   authorities   are   usually   not   able   to   verify   marketing   claims   or 
discover  opportunistic  behaviour.  What  is  needed  to  circumvent  these  
fundamental  problems  is an  investigation  scheme  that  covers  the  whole 
supply  chain  and  ensures  on- site  inspections  throughout  the  production  
process.  
Certifying  systems  are  able to guarantee  these  inspections,  which  is why 
they are gaining  popularity  on all levels of the  agrifood  chain [9]. Especially 
in  the  field  of  process  attributes,  quality  labels  have  become  the  most  
popular  consumer  marketing  tool [10]. By means  of  regular  control  and  – 
where   necessary  – additional  sampling,  neutral  inspection  institutions  
monitor  the  entire  supply  chain. Once having  been  awarded  the  requisite  
certificate,  companies  are  entitled  to  make  use  of  the  quality  label  for 
marketing  purposes.  Some  examples  of  recent  certification  systems  are 
the  various  labels  for  Organic  Farming,  Fairtrade,  Protected  Designation  
of Origin  (PDO), and  GM-free. New legal standards  such  as EC regulation  
No.  178/2002  on  traceability  will  surely  fuel  the  discussion  on  those  
forms  of quality assurance  which encompass  all stages  of production [11]. 
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to which  the  parties  involved  have so far paid  little attention.  The central  
task  of certification,  the  reduction  of information  asymmetry  within  the  
market,   can   be   fulfilled   only   if   the   institutions   in   charge   succeed   in 
assuring  certification  quality  and,  thus,  the  validity  of  the  audit  signal. 
Only  if the  underlying  organizations  succeed  in  establishing  a  quality 
reputation  in   markets   will  the  corresponding  labels   be  accepted  as  a 
quality   surrogate.   They   need   to   demonstrate   a   credible   commitment  
towards  the principles  and  specific regulations  of the  certification  system  
in question.  
A priori it cannot  be taken  for granted  that  the certifiers  or the companies  
to   be   audited   will   conform   to   the   established   regulations.   The 
thoroughness  of  the  audit  process  often  varies  considerably  as  control  
procedures  and  occupational  qualifications  have not  been  yet sufficiently  
well defined. 
All in  all, the  aforementioned  factors  indicate  existing  problems  in  the 
certification   processes.   Given   the   rapid   growth   and   the   still   poorly 
developed  structures  of  the  comparably  young  certification  market  as 
well as  the  lack  of experience  on  the  part  of  the  protagonists,  fraud  is 
likely to occur.  In the  following  the  institutional  structure  of certification  
systems  is analysed  in detail. The analysis  is mainly based  on analogies  in 
financial auditing.
3. Institutions and structures of certification
1.1. Institutional  framework  
“Certification   is   the   (voluntary)   assessment   and   approval   by   an 
(accredited)   party   on   an   (accredited)   standard” [12].  A  key   feature   of   a 
certification  system  is  that  inspections  are  carried  out  by  independent  
bodies  (third  party  audit)  beholden  to  standards  laid  down  by external  
organisations [13]. Basically, all systems  have  a similar  structure,  as shown  
in Figure 2. 
5Figure 2. Basic structure  of certification  (Jahn  et al. 2005)
The   starting   point   is   the   relationship   between   the   producer   and   the 
customer   (consumer   or   institutional   buyer).   The   supplier   provides   a 
certificate  serving  as quality  signal, which  is issued  by a neutral  certifier  
based   on   the   quality   and   certification   standards   laid   down   by   the 
standard  owner. Certifiers, in turn,  have to prove their  ability to carry out  
inspections   according   to   these   rules   through   an   accreditation.   This 
accreditation   is   usually   given   on   the   basis   of   the   ISO  65/EN   45011  
standard  (http://www.iso.org)  which  includes  general  requirements  for 
assessment   and   accreditation   of   certification   bodies.   Accreditation   is 
largely a formal  act and  does  not  include  supervision  of the  real working  
process.  This  explains  why  some  of  the  certification  systems  intend  to 
introduce  a monitoring  function  (“control- of- the- control”)  by involving 
either  private  institutions  or public authorities. 
Given the  basic elements  stated  above, different  certification  systems  can 
be described  according  to the standard  owner, responsible  for developing  
standards  and  control  procedures.  Firstly, there  are public (state- run) and  
private   initiatives:   Governmental   certification   systems   serve   consumer  
protection   purposes   by   providing   quality   labels   to   improve   market  
transparency.   In   recent   years,   operative   inspection   tasks   have   been  
delegated   predominantly   to   private   certifiers   monitored   by   public 
authorities   (e.g.,   Organic   Farming   or   PDO   labelling).   Public   standards  
make  it possible  to prevent  mislabelling  through  laws and  fines  enforced  
by public authorities.  As McCluskey [14] argues,  the  main  disadvantages  are 
a loss  of flexibility and  innovation,  lock- in- effects, and  few incentives  for 
overcompliance.
Nowadays,   most   certification   schemes   are   privately   organized.  
Certification  procedures  tend  to  be  significantly  different  depending  on 
whether  the  certification  is to be used  for  consumer  marketing  purposes  
or  should  meet  the  demands  of  institutional  buyers.  The  ISO 9000,  for  
example,   is   predominantly   a   business- to- business   (B-to- B)  marketing  
tool.  Other  well- known  examples  are  the  EurepGap  standard,  covering  
agricultural  producers,  and   the   BRC (British   Retail   Consortium)  or  its 
German   and   French   equivalent   IFS,   which   are   directed   towards   the  
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based  on the  retailers’ efforts  to control  the  suppliers.  Nevertheless,  as a 
countervailing   power   there   are   also   certification   systems   initiated   by 
suppliers  such  as the Assured  Farm Standard  (AFS) in British agriculture.  
While   the   above- mentioned   certifications   mainly   focus   on  the   supply  
chain, recent  times  have seen  a shift  towards  certification  labels  directed  
at the  consumer.  Among  these,  the  meat  industry  approaches  comprising  
the  whole  value  chain  (e.g., the  Dutch  IKB-system  or  the  German  QS-
system)  have  become  the  most  important.  Furthermore,  club  concepts  
such   as   the   labels   of   specific   associations   (e.g.,   organic   producer  
associations,   such   as   the   British   Soil   Association)   refer   to   one 
homogeneous   segment  of  an  industrial   sector   only.  The   MSC  (Marine 
Stewardship  Council) label aiming  at sustainable  fishing  practices  and  its 
equivalent  in  forestry,  the  Forest  Stewardship  Council  label  (FSC), are 
basically   supported   by   stakeholders   coming   from   different   NGOs 
(environmental,   consumer   or   development   policy).   Transfair   or   Max 
Havelaar  are  further  examples  of  this  type  of  labelling.  Finally,  some  
individual  certifying  organizations  such  as EFSIS or the  German  Technical 
Inspection  Agency (TÜV) have developed  standards  of their  own. Figure  3 
provides   a   typology   of   these   different   private   certification   systems  
according  to their importance  for consumer  marketing.
Figure 3. Typology of private  certification  systems  (Jahn  et al. 2005)
1.2. Reliability of the quality signal
Figure   2  described   the   parties   involved   in   a   certification   system.   In 
practice,  this  simplified  outline  is however  blurred,  as  all parties  act  as 
economic  players.  Since  the  intended  de  lege  structure  of  certification  
systems  can  deviate  from  the  de  facto  form,  an  analysis  of certification  
systems   aiming   at   improving   the   functioning   of   certification   systems  
must  include  tendencies  towards  opportunistic  behaviour.  Considering  
the  great  number  of customers  demanding  a special certificate  from  their  
suppliers,  manufacturers  are  increasingly  under  (economic)  pressure  to 
become   certified.   Several   studies   have   revealed   that   suppliers   view 
certifications   as   externally   imposed   obligations   rather   than   as 
intrinsically  motivated  quality  management  systems [15]. Hence,  it can  be 
assumed   that   suppliers   are   not   interested   in   the   highest   possible  
standard   of   inspection.   As   strict   inspections   lower   the   probability   of 
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known  to employ low inspection  standards [16]. 
Correspondingly,  certifiers  can  act  in  the  same  way  assuming  a  given 
inspection  fee,  i.e., will seek  to  minimise  their  audit  costs.  In addition, 
they  can  become  dependent  on  their  clients  through  a special  form  of 
setting  the  fee, known  in auditing  theory  as  “low- balling” [17]. In order  to 
win  the  contract,  auditors  set  the  fee  for  the  first  inspection  far  below 
their   calculated   real   costs.  As   profits  tend   to   be  realized   only   in  an 
ongoing   business   relationship,   the   annual   returns   from   subsequent  
inspections   represent   a   quasi- rent   since   they   depend   on   customer  
loyalty.  Low- balling  makes  the  inspector  undesirably  dependent  on  his 
client [18]. 
Furthermore   as   each   individual   inspector   is   an   agent   of   a   larger  
certification  company,  it cannot  be  assumed  that  every  certifier  (agent) 
pursues   the   same   objectives   as   the   certification   company   (respective 
principal) [19]. In  fact,  an  agent  can  maximise  his  or  her  own  profit.  In 
practice, this includes  bribery by the company  he or she has  been  ordered  
to inspect  (i.e., side contracts) [20].
4. Reliability of the audit procedure: from checklists to risk 
oriented auditing
With  the  growing  importance  of  certification  as  a quality  signal  in  the 
agribusiness,  the  reliability of the  schemes  is a crucial  factor  for  trust  in 
the  institutions  and  credibility  of  consumer  and  business- to- business  
marketing.  Our  theoretical  considerations  allow  some  initial  suggestions  
that  weak  auditing  and  in  some  cases  even  cheating  are  relevant  food  
safety   risks.   To   our   best   knowledge,   there   are   no   broader   empirical  
analyses  on  the  reliability  and  validity  of  audits  in quality  certification.  
However,  there  are  a  number  of  case  studies  on  the  quality  of  social 
auditing [21]. 
For  example,  an  article  in  the  Financial  Times  that  unveiled  the  fraud  
practices   used   by   Chinese   firms   drew   considerable   attention.  
International  auditing  firms  which  certify  textile  suppliers  in China  with  
standards  such  as the SA 8000, presumably  are systematically fooled  (e.g. 
by use of computer- faked  pay slips) [22]. A recent  in- depth  report  analyses  
the   practices   of   auditors   during   the   execution   of   social   audits   in 
developing  countries [23]. The  authors  describe  the  certification  as  a cat-
and- mouse   game   between   naïve   and   badly   trained   auditors   and  
unscrupulous   managers,   in   which   the   auditors   presently   lack   the 
possibilities  for  effective  monitoring.  Thus,  it can  be concluded  that  the  
certification   practices   have   already   suffered   considerable   credibility 
losses,   at   least   regarding   the   working   conditions   in   developing   and  
threshold  countries.  It, therefore,  seems  reasonable  to preventively think  
about   the   weak   points   in   agribusiness,   before   a   comparable   loss   of 
credibility also occurs  here. 
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incapable   of   unveiling   substantial   material   deficiencies   but   primarily 
evaluates  formal  factors  as checklist  governance. A second  connotation  of 
this  term  which  has  been  used  over  the  last  few years  in the  context  of 
developments  in US-American  auditing [24] refers  to  the  procedure  of the  
audit.  Checklist  Governance  is an auditing  procedure  where  the  certifiers  
use  a checklist  to  – somewhat  schematically  – control  the  existence  of 
certain   quality   performance   elements.   For   companies   on   the   same  
production  stage,  typically  similar,  mostly  even  equal  requirements  are 
made   in   the   criteria   catalogues   of   the   system   owners.   Usually,   no 
attention  is paid  to special characteristics  and  conditions  of the industrial  
sectors  during  the  audit.  Instead,  the  audit  of the  company  is carried  out  
based  on  a  formal  checklist,  which  is  executed  point  by  point  by  the 
auditor  without  any economic  incentives  to unveil material  shortcomings.  
In sum,  checklist  governance  is, in our  eyes, a hypothesis  about  reliability 
problems  of  auditing,  which  might  be  due  to  an  insufficient  auditing  
model. 
In this  contribution,  we oppose  this  model  based  on standardization  and  
uniformity   of   the   auditing   process   with   the   concept   of   risk   oriented  
auditing. We, therefore,  revert  to concepts  from  auditing  theory. Since the 
1970s  and  increasingly  after  the  recent  scandals,  auditing  theory  has  
developed  approaches  that  are geared  to the  risk potential  of the  audited  
company.  The same  basic  parameters  that  led to the  development  of the 
risk   oriented   auditing   concept   similarly   apply   to   today’s   certification  
systems.  Certifiers  in agribusiness  are in severe competition  for contracts,  
which  are  commissioned  by the  companies  that  are  to  be audited.  Here 
the  risk  of false  incentives  and  adverse  selection  is high [25]. Furthermore  
the  fast  growth  of the  certification  systems  could  lead  to  the  suspicion  
that   auditing   procedures   and   staff   qualifications   have   not   yet   been  
sufficiently developed.  
5. Empirical results  on  the  auditing  quality  of  certification 
audits
1.3. Data base
Previous  surveys  which  dealt  with  the  empirical  funding  of audit  quality 
refer red   to   single   case   studies   and   undercover   observations   of   the  
auditing  practice [21]. The  downsides  of  this  approach  lie in the  complex 
possibilities  to generalise  the results  and  in the lacking verifiability of the 
reports.   The   following   analysis,   therefore,   uses   a   different   approach  
based  on  data  of  the  QS GmbH,  comprising  all  previous  examination  
results  (2002- 2005). Of the  102,648  audits,  98.8 % where  carried  out  in 
Germany  and  85,218  in  the  agricultural  sector,  on  which  the  following 
considerations  are focused.
The  subsequent  study  was  conducted  with  support  of  the  German  QS-
system.   Their   data   base   contains   data   entry   forms   filled   out   by   the  
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the results  of the audits. The following information  is collected: name  and  
registered  office of the  certification  company,  name  of the  auditor,  name  
and  registered  office  of  the  client,  type  of  business,  product  category, 
date  of the  audit,  overall result  of the  audit,  score  per  criterion,  duration  
of  the  audit,  type  of  audit  (regular  or  sample).  The  certifier  awards  a 
differentiated  auditing  judgment  with  the  four  nuances  „QS-status  1“ (at 
least  90  out  of  100  possible  points),  „QS-status  2“ (<  90- 80 %), „QS-
status  3“ (<  80- 70 %) and  „failed“. The  latter  can  either  be the  result  of 
insufficient  performance  (<  70 %) or  of a single,  particularly  severe  flaw 
(K.O.-criteria).
Table 1. QS-status  of the agricultural  sectors  in Germany: comparison
QS status  1
(100- 90%)
QS status  2
(<90- 80%)
QS status  3
(<80- 70%)
Certification  






















Pork 33,686 89.7 2,627 7.0 286 0.8 943 2.5 37,542
Beef 40,919 89.4 3,293 7.2 385 0.8 1,196 2.6 45,793
Poultry 1,836 97.5 32 1.7 2 0.1 13 0.7 1,883
Total 76,441 89.7 5,952 7.0 673 0.8 2,152 2.5 85,218
Source data: QS Qualität  und  Sicherheit  GmbH 
The audit  results  of the  three  sectors  certified  by QS in agriculture  (AGR) 
are  depicted  in  Table  1. It can  be seen  that  altogether  auditors  awarded  
very  good  evaluations.  Most  firms  (89.7 %) received  the  certificate  „QS-
status   1“.   On   average,   only   2.5 %  of   the   firms   failed   the   audit. 1  The 
performance  of the  poultry  producers  was  significantly  higher  than  that  
of the pork  and  beef producers.  
The  results  indicate  that  the  probability  of failing  the  audit  is relatively 
low. The QS-system  at its core is an approach  for securing  minimum  legal 
standards.  It can  thus  be expected  that  the  vast  majority  of the  audited  
companies  will successfully  pass  the  audit.  It also  seems  plausible  that  
the  vertically  integrated  poultry  fattening,  which  is  also  monitored  by 
large- scale  poultry  processors  shows  fewer  weak  points  than  the  red  
meat  market.  Nevertheless,  there  is also the  risk that  the low failure  rates  
conceal deficiencies  of the auditing  process  – checklist  governance?
1.4. Differences   in   the   auditing   quality   of   different   certification  
organisations
Starting  point  of  the  next  step  of  analysis  is  the  hypothesis  that  the  
certifiers   –  whether   due   to   deficiencies   in   competence   or   economic  
pressure  – do not  all conduct  their  audits  with  the  same  diligence. If this  
is the case, there  should  be significant  variations  in the auditing  results  of 
the different  firms  or certifiers. To eliminate  the influence  of the different  
business   sectors,   the   following   calculations   are   delimited   to   pork  
1 Of these, 929 firms  (43.2 %) failed  by K.O.-judgment.  
10production.  In addition,  it seems  necessary  to  focus  the  analysis  on  one 
German  state  to avoid regional effects, which are reported  in Table 2. 
Table 2. QS-status  of pork  producers  in regional comparison 2
QS status  1
(100- 90%)
QS status  2
(<90- 80%)






















BB 241 92.0 14 5.3 4 1.5 3 1.1 262
BW 2,420 89.4 206 7.6 12 0.4 68 2.5 2,706
BV 6,328 88.6 456 6.4 17 0.2 341 4.8 7,142
HE 377 83.2 37 8.2 12 2.6 27 6.0 453
MWP 186 94.4 7 3.6 3 1.5 1 0.5 197
LS 10,519 93.5 565 5.0 57 0.5 114 1.0 11,255
NRW 10,216 86.4 1,124 9.5 168 1.4 320 2.7 11,828
RP 329 95.9 11 3.2 0 0.0 3 0.9 343
SA 256 90.8 22 7.8 1 0.4 3 1.1 282
SH 1,387 92.7 87 5.8 5 0.3 18 1.2 1,497
SN 209 92.1 15 6.6 1 0.4 2 0.9 227
TH 203 91.0 9 4.0 1 0.4 10 4.5 223
G 33,686 89.7 2,627 7.0 286 0.76 943 2.5 37,542
NL 475 82.9 6 1.0 3 0.52 89 15.5 573
BB  =  Brandenburg ;   BW  =  Baden- Wuerttemberg ;   BV  =  Bavaria;   HE   =  Hesse ;   MWP   =  
Mecklenburg- Western   Pomerania ; LS =  Lower  Saxony; NRW =  North   Rhine- Westphalia ; RP =  
Rhineland- Palatinate ;  SA  =  Saxony- Anhalt ;  SH  =  Schleswig- Holstein ;  SN  =  Saxony;  TH   =  
Thuringia ;  
G= Germany; NL =  Netherlands
Source data: QS Qualität  und  Sicherheit  GmbH 
Figure  4 shows  that  the  audit  outcomes  also  differ  regarding  some  main  
criteria  in  pork  production.  Farmers  from  Lower  Saxony  have  a  better  
internal  control  than  the average farmer  in Germany  and  the Netherlands.  
2  The   table   only   shows   states   where   more   than   100   audits   carried   out.   Line   „G“ 






















































Lower Saxony Germany Netherlands
Figure 4. Audit results  for pork  production: comparison  of Germany, 
Netherlands  and  Lower Saxony 3 (Source data: QS Qualität  und  Sicherheit  
GmbH)
The   above- mentioned   variations   can   be   due   either   to   regional   sector  
characteristics   as,   for   example,   the   difference   in   farm   size,   or   to 
differently  „strict“  certifiers  who  have  their  focal  point  in one  state.  For 
the  following, we, therefore,  will focus  on the state  of Lower Saxony as an 
example. Table 3 shows  a central  finding  of the analysis. 
Table 3. Auditing results  of certification  bodies  (Lower Saxony; pork) 4
QS status  1
(100- 90%)
QS status  2
(<90- 80%)





CB rows  % rows  % rows  % rows  %
A 98.6 1.4 0.0 0.0
B 98.3 1.2 0.1 0.3
C 95.3 3.9 0.2 0.6
D 93.7 3.6 0.0 2.8
E 92.9 2.9 0.0 4.3
F 92.7 5.4 0.2 1.7
G 90.4 7.4 1.1 1.2
H 86.3 1.4 0.0 12.3
Ø 93.5 5.0 0.5 1.0
Source data: QS Qualität  und  Sicherheit  GmbH (CB=Certification  Body)
There  are  highly  significant  differences  between  the  auditing  judgments  
of certification  bodies  who have audited  pork  producers  in Lower Saxony. 
3 Means; N =  37,542  for Germany; Lower Saxony N =  11,255  and  Netherlands  N =  573. 
4  The   auditing   companies   are   made   anonymous   by   letters.   For   a   more   convenient  
presentation,  only  auditing  companies  are  listed  that  performed  more  than  33  audits. 
Thus, eight  companies  with  a total of 103 audits  are not  listed.  The line “Total” includes  
these  eight  auditing  companies.  
12The   spread   ranges   from   86.3 %  of   companies   in   „QS-status   1“   by 
certification  body H to 98.6 % by certification  body A. 
Given  the  large  sample,  the  limitation  to  one  state  and  one  sector,  it is 
difficult  to find  other  comprehensible  reasons  for the  reported  variations  
than  weaknesses  of the  auditing  process.  The failure  rate  for certification  
body  H, for example,  is over  12 %, while at body  A, only 1,4 % were  rated  
below  „status  1“ and  none  failed  the  audit.  Auditing  body  G rated  many  
companies  in  „QS-status  2“, while  the  failure  rate  was  average.  Quite  
obviously,  these  differences,  which  can  also  be  demonstrated  in  other  
states  and  sectors,  point  to deviations  in the auditing  practice.
Table 4. Comparison  of auditing  results  dependent  on the auditors  
(Lower Saxony; pork) 5
QS status  1
(100- 90%)
QS status  2
(<90- 80%)

















A1 98.3 1.7 0.0 0.0 01:32
B1 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 01:27
C1 98.1 1.3 0.2 0.4 01:24
D1 93.2 3.8 0.0 3.0 01:35
E1 91.1 3.6 0.0 5.4 01:44
F1 96.0 2.0 0.0 2.0 01:27
G1 74.9 18.2 3.7 3.2 01:29
H1 86.3 1.4 0.0 12.3 01:56
Ø 93.5 5.0 0.5 1.0 01:38
Source data: QS Qualität  und  Sicherheit  GmbH 
These  findings  are supported  by comparable  variations  in the  analys is of 
the single auditors  (see Table 4). In Lower Saxony, 110 auditors  have been  
active  in the  certification  of pig holdings  since  2002.  The  auditors  were  
either  employees  of a certification  body or individual  auditors.  Of the 110  
auditors,  44 conducted  less  than  10 audits  and  32 conducted  more  than  
100   (84.0 %  of   all   audits).   Five   auditors   even   issued   more   than   500 
certificates  each,  and  thus  account  for  35.9 % of  all audits  in  the  pork  
sector.  This  high  concentration  might  lead  to competence  deficiencies  of 
the   less   involved   auditors.   However,   it   could   also   indicate   stress   of 
competition  (low- cost  strategy) and  a strongly  varying  duration/intensity  
of the  audits.  Auditor  H1, for  example,  on  average  inspected  30 minutes  
longer  than  auditor  C1, who  conducted  a particularly  large  number  of 
audits.
Table 5. Results  of the system  and  sample  check in comparison  (pork)
QS status  1
(100- 90%)
QS status  2
(<90- 80%)






N r N rows N rows N rows quantit
5 The line “average” (Ø) includes  all auditors.  
13ows
% % % % y
Lower 
Saxony:
System  audit 10,51
9 93.5 565 5.0 57 0.5 114 1.0 11,255
Sample 102 85.0 12 10.0 5 4.2 1 0.8 120
Germany:
System  audit 33,68
6 89.7 2,62
7 7.0 286 0.8 943 2.5 37,542
Sample 327 83.8 30 7.7 13 3.3 20 5.1 390
Source data: QS Qualität  und  Sicherheit  GmbH
Further  hints  of  deficiencies  of  the  auditing  process  are  given  by  the  
newly  introduced  spot  checks  in the  QS-system  in which  the  QS GmbH 
randomly   chooses   companies   to   undergo   additional   testing   without  
announcements.   There   are   highly   significant   differences   between   the 
results  of the spot  checks  and  those  of the  system  audit  (regular  audit) in 
Germany   as   well   as   in   Lower   Saxony  (see   Table   5).   Quite   obviously, 
stricter  standards  are applied  in the spot  checks.
1.5. Reasons  for the audit  differences  
The  variations  in the  auditing  results  we have  outlined  above  first  of all 
document   varying   assessment   standards   between   the   different  
certification   bodies   and   auditors.   However,   several   interpretations   of 
these  variations  are possible. One the one hand,  know- how differences  of 
the  auditors  and  varying  auditing  intensities  could  be the  reason  for  the 
variations.  On  the  other  hand,  economic  dependences  could  cause  an 
auditor  to issue  „courtesy  certificates“. 
Differences   in   the   auditing   quality   are   likely   because   all   certification  
concepts  in agribusiness  are still in the  stage  of implementation  and  only 
few re- audits  have  been  carried  out  so far. Thus,  it can  be assumed  that  
single  auditors  might  still  lack  appropriate  training  and  knowledge.  As 
yet, there  is no  specific training  in agribusiness  for  the  newly developed  
occupation  of  the  certifier.  Competence  deficiencies  have  already  been  
detected   by   the   system   owners   (e.g.   QS   GmbH),   whereupon   training  
efforts  and  auditing  guidelines  have been  substantiated  and  expanded.





















in Germany, total 43 2347.1 33,374 1 21.6 7
7.2
in G, only  
agriculture 28 3061.9 32,979 3 59.0 8
1.8
in G, agr., only  
pork 28 1354.7 10,178 3 50.3 7
5.9
Only Lower 
Saxony  and agr. 25 946.1 7,947 1 77.3 9
3.7
Only Lower 
Saxony, agr. and 
pork 
23 710.9 4,699 1 77.6 9
6.5
Source data: QS Qualität  und  Sicherheit  GmbH
The  second  potential  cause  of the  varying  auditing  results  are  economic  
dependences.   In   our   certification   scheme,   the   client   can   choose   the 
certification  body.  The  pronounced  stress  of  competition  and  the  low 
prices   that   certifiers   report   in   personal   conversations   can   lead   some  
auditors   to   deliberately   audit   inattentively  in   order   to   minimise   their  
costs  and  at  the  same  time  increase  the  chances  for  re- contracting  and  
recommendation.  This  is based  on the  interest  of the  audited  companies  
(that  is, the  customers)  to  certainly  pass  the  audit.  They  will avoid  very 
strict  auditors  and  exert  pressure.  This  effect  can  be  especially  strong  
when  individual  clients  have  power ful  positions.  This  is  the  case,  for 
example,   in   the   QS-system,   because   here,   so- called   “Buendler” 
(slaughterhouse  companies,  co- operatives  marketing  associations) choose  
the  auditor  for  all connected  companies  (in many  cases  several  hundred  
farmers).  A very  similar  situation  can  be  found  for  further  certification  
standards   such   as   IFS  or   EurepGap.   Table 6   indicates   the   resulting  
concentration  (concentration  ratio/CR) in the certification  market.  
6. Risk oriented auditing in the agribusiness
The   above   mentioned   problem   can  cause   manifest   safety   risks.   The 
system  operators  (QS, IFS, EurepGap  etc.) can  react  in different  ways  to 
the  problems  presented  as examples.  For one thing, they try to assure  the 
uniformity   of   the   tests   by   a   standardisation   of   the   audits.   A  trend  
towards   this   procedure   can   be   found   by   analysing,   for   example,   the 
development  of the  certification  process  for  securing  organic  production  
(EU-regulation  no.  2092/91).  While this  process  started  out  with  a thin  
booklet  of  obligations,  these  days  the  auditor  has  to  follow  a checklist  
where  even  details  of the  tests  are  specified  in an  audit  handbook  with 
hundreds  of pages. 
From  our  point  of view, another  approach  seems  to  be more  promising. 
Although   it   might   seem   counter- intuitive   at   first   glance,   it   can   be 
15plausibly  argued  that  a detailed  specification  of the  auditing  procedures  
will, in the  long run,  result  in a lower  auditing  quality. Such  a regulation  
of the actions  relieves  the auditor  of the effort  to individually improve  the  
auditing  quality. He will be able  to  prove  the  duly  conducted  audit  by a 
technically  correct  „checking  off“ of  his  checklists,  even  if, at  the  same  
time,  the  crucial  quality  risks  remain  unnoticed  because  they  are  not  
provided  by the checklist. 
Thus,   we   conclude   by   suggesting   a   stronger   concentration   on   risk 
oriented  auditing  approaches.  These  focus  more  strongly  on the  personal  
responsibility  of  the  auditor  by providing  him  with  more  leeway  in the 
auditing   process.   First   of   all,   it   is   important   to   develop   incentive 
structures   within   the   system   that   economically   foster   the   auditor’s 
interest  in a high  auditing  quality – controlling  results  instead  of actions.  
The  literature [25]  provides  three  basic  starting  points  for  a risk  oriented  
strategy. The crucial influencing  factors  are:
1. Extending  the liabilities  of the certifier,
2. Strengthening  the  reputational  impact  on  the  certification  market  
and
3. Reducing  the  dependence   of the  certifier  on  the  companies  to  be 
audited.
While these  aspects  aim  at  improving  the  auditing  quality  by optimising  
the influencing  factors  in the certification  environment,  risk orientation  is 
the  central  approach  to improving  the  auditing  technology.  The purpose  
of  the  discussed  concept  is  the  alignment  of  the  audits  with  the  risk 
situation   and   risk   potential   of   the   individual   client [26].   In   traditional  
auditing,  where  this  approach  has  been  widely  discussed,  the  auditor  
relies  on the  so- called  audit  risk. This  risk  constitutes  a false  estimation  
of   the   annual   accounts   where   the   audit   certificate   is   unwittingly   not  
restricted   or   rejected,   even   though   the   annual   accounts   contain  
significant   flaws [27].  The   risk   is   composed   of   several   subcomponents.  
Firstly,  the  risk  of  error  occurring  specifies  the  probability  that  errors  
fundamentally   occur   in   the   population.   Secondly,   the   detection   risk 
renders  the risk that  the flaws  occurring  in the  company  are not  detected  
by the  auditor  concrete [28]. This  risk  originates  in the  choice  of improper  
procedures  and  in personal  deficiencies  of the  auditor [29]. The influencing  
factors  of  the  error  risk  include  an  inherent  risk  as  well  as  a  control  
risk [30].   While   the   inherent   risk   refers   to   the   probability   that   errors  
generally  occur  in the  absence  of a monitoring  system  which  lead  to  an 
improper  audit  entirety [31],  the  control  risk  shows  the  probability  that  
important  errors  are not detected  by the monitoring  system  and  reach  the  
annual  accounts [32]. 
If this  approach  is applied  to the  certification  systems  of agriculture  and  
food  economy,  the  differences  and  peculiarities  of the  quality  assurance  
systems  have  to be accommodated  in a modified  model.  Figure  5 shows  
the described  concept  in enhanced  form.
16Figure 5. The quality assurance  risk and  its subcomponents  (personal  
illustration)
Substantial   differences   between   financial   auditing   and   the   quality 
certification  arise  not  only  for  the  risk  of  error  occurring  due  to  the  
number  of  different  stages  in  the  supply  chain  and  the  heterogeneous  
auditing  object.  Basic institutional  conditions  that  are  set  by the  system  
and  that  influence  the  detection  risk  are  also  of  importance.  Firstly,  in 
this   case   a   greater   number   of   institutions   are   directly   or   indirectly 
involved  in the  auditing  process.  Furthermore,  the  private- sector  base  of 
the   system   results   in   a   radically   different   perspective   towards   the 
auditing,   it’s   significance   and   objective.   These   factors   make   up   the 
external  conditions  for the audits  and  influence  the  possibilities  to detect  
mistakes.  Different  from  traditional  auditing,  the  detection  risk,  thus,  is 
not  only dependent  on the quality and  personality  of the auditor,  but  also 
on   the   conditions   that   the   system   owner   and   the   certification   body 
provide  for  him.  Not  only  the  individual  auditor,  but  also  the  system  
owners  should  use a risk oriented  approach  when  auditing  the auditors.  
The differences  between  lines  of business,  region s and  added  value levels 
that  only briefly highlighted  in the  above  analysis  of the  audit  data  base  
can  be analysed  in more  detail in further  contributions,  focussing  on the  
respective  weak spots  to be able to quantitatively assess  at least  some  of 
the  risk  areas  included  in  Figure  5. This  could  lead  to clues  for  auditing  
intervals,  auditing  depth,  unannounced  spot  checks  and  differentiated  
auditing   focuses   –   questions   that   should   all   be   subject   to   coming  
research.  
7. Conclusion
The  study  reveals  initial  empirical  data  which  underline  the  threat  of 
weak  auditing  procedures  in quality  certification  systems.  Beyond  single 
case studies, anecdotic  information  or rumours,  statistical analysis  clearly 
indicates  differences  between  various  certification  bodies  (auditors). 
The  study  was  conducted  with  support  of the  German  QS GmbH  which  
demonstrates  their  willingness  to improve  the  scheme.  The system  owner  
is   interested   in   enhancing   the   audit   quality   and   preventing   possible  
structural   deficits.   First   objectives,   which   were   developed   after   a 
presentation   of   our   results   to   the   QS  GmbH,   are   more   random   spot  
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17checks  and  training  for  certification  bodies  with  deviant  audit  results. 
Furthermore,  a systematic  data  warehouse  will be implemented  to  allow 
automatically conducted  quality control  routines.  
The risk  oriented  approach  contrast  sharply  to some  expectations  in the 
agribusiness   that   auditing   should   be   more   standardised   and   equal. 
Certification  systems  which  try  to  introduce  risk  classifications  have  to 
convince   clients   and   certification   bodies   of   the   advantages   of   risk 
oriented  approaches.  At first  sight,  different  auditing  intervals,  auditing  
depth,   unannounced   spot   checks   and   differentiated   auditing   focuses  
seems   to   be   unfair   for   some   clients.   However,   in   the   long   run,   a 
certification   system   can   only   survive   if   it   is   able   to   guarantee   the  
unobservable  credence  qualities  which  lie in the  foreground  of consumer  
interest  (food  safety,  animal  welfare,  social  standards  etc.). The  use  of 
checklists  is a necessary  tool  for  auditing,  but  risk  oriented  means  are 
much  more  useful  to safeguard  against  opportunistic  behaviour.
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